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A

s the West retrenches and new powers emerge,
students of international relations are well
positioned to address an outstanding question:
How to thrive in a multipolar world? The question—and
the answers which we bring to bear—resonate beyond
geopolitics. This is because the task of living together
in diversity is arguably the greatest analytical as well as
normative challenge facing world politics more broadly
(Fisher-Onar, Pearce, and Keyman 2018).
In this intervention, I address the question of living
together in a multipolar world from an IR perspective.
I suggest that dominant approaches like realism and
liberalism, which favor Western-centric categories and
large-N data, fail to capture important dynamics. I then
make the case for family resemblances as a method of
cross-regional comparison which enables the analyst to
examine cases typically boxed into different area studies
compartments. Finally, I operationalize the approach
towards a baseline for comparison across Eurasia’s
revisionist former empires: China, Russia, Iran, and
Turkey. I argue that by thus establishing a basis for
comparison, we uncover patterns relevant to prospects
for cooperation as well as conflict in a post-Western
world.
Multipolarity: Views from the IR Tower
Attempts from within IR to make sense of
multipolarity are often informed by positivist approaches
like realism and liberal institutionalism.1 Realist tools
include concepts like revisionist versus status quo powers
and their quest for status (Davidson 2006; Volgy et al.
2011), hegemonic stability, its eclipse and preventive
war (Gilpin 1988; Levy 2011), the balance of power
(Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann 2004; Kaufman, Little, and
Wohlforth 2007), and power transition (Tammen 2008).
Such work offers a bird’s-eye view and can help elucidate
major mid-range questions like prospects for war
between the retrenching United States and rising China.
Yet, there are limitations for the study of multipolarity.
First, realism privileges substantive questions relevant to

great power—especially American—interests like nuclear
proliferation (Kang 2003). This goes hand-in-hand with
a tendency to ignore phenomena that appear pervasive
to emerging powers—including nascent superpower
China—like racialized hierarchies in world order.
Second, realists, like many others across the North
American IR academy, tend to favor macro-quantitative
methods which aggregate large numbers of randomized
cases. By glossing over differences between cases, and
ignoring outliers, the claim to universal purchase becomes
possible (Berg-Scholsser 2018). The trade-off is that
studies do not register nuance (Ahram 2013). As a result,
the large-N analyst may overlook major motivational and
behavioral patterns, including phenomena with causal
force. A case in point is the game-changing role which
counterintuitive alliances can play in and across national
contexts (Fisher Onar and Evin 2010; Hart and Jones
2010).
An alternative approach is liberal institutionalism.
Liberals are more likely to open the black box of domestic
politics and thus to access non-Western readings of
world order. However, liberals’ concern is often less with
non-Western perspectives than with the capacity of the
Western-led liberal order and its institutions to co-opt
challengers (Owen 2001; Ikenberry 2008). The primacy
placed on Western concerns is evident in the intense but
short-lived “hype” (Zarakol 2019) around the BRICS,
which dissipated when these emerging economies
wobbled by the mid-2010s (Hurrell 2019). Nevertheless,
the relative share of economic and normative power
enjoyed by the United States and Europe continues to
diminish. As anger at relative decline finds expression
in phenomena like Brexit and the Trump presidency,
the capacity of the Western-led liberal order to absorb
challenges under multipolarity remains in question, a
concern brought into dramatic focus by the COVID-19
pandemic.

1 For a discussion of how other, critical approaches within IR address the question, see Fisher Onar 2013; 2018.
Qualitative and Multi-Method Research | 15

Multipolarity:
Views from—and across—Area Studies
If realist and liberal frames for reading multipolarity
tell only part of the story, how to better access rising
powers’ perspectives? Given that the challenge is how to
thrive in a world of many poles, the ability to triangulate across
poles is valuable. Engagement of other perspectives can
foster epistemological and pragmatic openings for more
pluralistic research and foreign policy practices (Saylor,
this issue; Acharya 2011; Fisher Onar and Nicolaidis
2013). That said, cross-regional triangulation is useful even
if the analyst rejects the critical project of decentering
international relations. Strategic reconnaissance of other
cultures for defensive or offensive purposes is a wellestablished tradition. Examples include the adventures
of British and Russian imperial agents in the nineteenthcentury “great game” over Eurasia, and the foundation
of area studies within the US academy during the Cold
War to inform policy makers about non-Western regions
(King 2015).
These (neo-)colonial origins notwithstanding, area
studies today offers interdisciplinary insights into the
cultures, economies, political systems, and foreign
policies of non-Western powers. It leverages the
nuanced knowledge of historians, linguists, geographers,
anthropologists, sociologists, and diplomats, among
others. Area studies attends, moreover, to issues of
geopolitical significance from migration and social
movements to political economy and the sociology of
religion. In each of these arenas, field experts are likely to
draw conclusions that are both more accurate and more
contingent than those of counterparts in the IR tower.
Such sensitivities can be useful in the management of
multipolar complexity.
Yet area studies are no panacea. Respect for
complexity is a normative and a methodological
commitment; it can yield rich, often counter-intuitive
insights, but also insistence on the sui generis nature of
each case. This tendency is reinforced by the structural
division of labor between area compartments within the
academy. Thus, experts on one world region (like the
Middle East) rarely converse with specialists on or from
other regions (like East Asia), nor develop cross-regional
expertise. The upshot is that important insights may be
difficult to translate across regional specializations, much
less to disciplinary IR or political science.
The challenge, then, is to mediate between problemdriven respect for case or cross-case specificity on
one hand, and broader relevance on the other. Enter
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Comparative Area Studies (CAS), defined by Ahram,
Köllner, and Sil (2018, 3) as any “self-conscious effort” to
simultaneously: (i) “balance deep sensitivity to context…
us[ing] some variant of the comparative method to
surface causal linkages that are portable across world
regions; and, (ii) engage ongoing research and scholarly
discourse in two or more area studies communities
against the backdrop of more general concepts and
theoretical debates within a social science discipline.”
As Sil (2018) suggests, CAS often entails crossregional, contextualized small-N comparisons. With
regard to emerging powers, this intermediate level of
analysis helps to capture variance within and across
actors in different regions, teasing out cross-cutting
patterns. For example, the ability to recognize that a
power struggle is unfolding in X state where moderates
are outmaneuvering hardliners, and to compare and
contrast such struggles across X, Y, and Z states affords
very different insights—and policy prescriptions—than
reading states as monolithic blocks (Fisher Onar 2021).
Family Resemblances and Eurasia’s
Former Empires: China, Russia, Iran,
Turkey
There are many ways to operationalize crossregional comparison as showcased in this symposium
and the edited volume by which it was inspired. As a
contribution to the toolkit, I invoke the notion of
“family resemblances,” defined as cases that share
significant overlapping elements even though they may
not uniformly display one common feature. As Goertz
(1994) suggests, family resemblances offer a handle on
concepts which are “intuitively understandable,” such as
electoral authoritarianism, but difficult to formulate in
terms of “exact specification or definition” due to the
presence of overlapping features across cases rather than
identical “hard cores” (25).
The notion of family resemblances serves
comparative area studies because it enables the analyst
to escape the straitjacket of Cold War regional categories
which tend to emphasize the role of geography over
history, sociology, or economics in shaping outcomes
(Pepinsky, this issue). By thus assessing resemblances
across regional foci one can identify similarities and
differences for fresh insights into actors that are
otherwise lumped together (in large-N studies) or kept
separate (in single- or area-bound small-N studies). Such
patterns, in turn, can be probed towards refining the
operative concept, hypothesis generation, identification
of necessary and sufficient causal mechanisms, and

inductive theory-building (Goertz and Mahoney 2012). 2
To demonstrate, I turn to a cross-regional,
contextualized small-N set of cases which demand a
medium level of expertise in return for a medium level
of portability. The four cases—China, Russian, Iran, and
Turkey—are geostrategic but rarely compared. Spanning
the Eurasian landmass from the eastern Mediterranean
to the Pacific, they have figured prominently in Western
grand strategy since at least the great game between
Britain and Russia. From the “Heartland” thesis of
Anglo-American strategists in the early twentieth century
through to Robert Kaplan’s 2018 book The Return of Marco
Polo’s World, these states have long served as the “other”
of European and American geopolitical imaginaries
(Morozov and Rumelili 2012; Fettweis 2017). At the
dawn of multipolarity, such anxieties are exacerbated
by these countries’ revisionist behavior across the vast
Eurasian geography (Mayer 2018).
However, operationalizing comparison is challenging.
This is due to cross-case discrepancy when assessed via
conventional IR or area studies criteria like material
capacity or cultural attributes. Thus, for the IR scholar,
Turkey and Iran are, at most, multi-regional middle
powers with spoiler potential, while Russia is arguably
a declining great power, and China a rising superpower.
One can draw on the flourishing regional powers literature
to address these differences (Nolte 2010; Parlar Dal
2016), but the fact remains that these four states present
an “apples, oranges, and cherries” problem, as it were,
regarding their comparative magnitude. Meanwhile, for
the area studies analyst, historical, linguistic and sundry
other specificities make comparisons between even
Turkey and Iran problematic, much less with Russia and
China.
Nevertheless, there is meaningful overlap, I argue, in
China, Russia, Iran, and Turkey’s trajectories. The family
resemblance emanates from their common experience
as “revisionist former empires.” This feature matters
because imperial legacies, both real and imagined, shape
national projects and foreign policies (Fisher Onar 2013;
2015; 2018).
Consider that all four are: (i) successor states to
large and long-lived, geographically contiguous Eurasian

empires which, (ii) since the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, and especially during the “long nineteenth
century,” were overshadowed by European colonial
powers (and by a Japan reinvented along European lines).
European expansion was due to military primacy and
emergent forms of political and economic organization,
namely, the nation-state and capitalist industrialization.
But if these features helped Europeans achieve global
conquest, (iii) the four Eurasian empires commanded
sufficient state capacity to retain formal sovereignty.
This overlapping experience distinguishes China, Russia,
Iran, and Turkey from the vast majority of non-Western
actors who were thoroughly subjugated.3 (iv) In response,
moreover, reformists in each empire outmaneuvered
traditionalists to pursue military, political, and economic
modernization along Western lines for the paradoxical
purpose of defense against the West.
(v) The four empires finally collapsed within roughly
the same decade in the Chinese revolutions of 1911 and
1913, the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917, the
Young Turk and Kemalist revolutions of 1908 and 1923;
and the establishment of constitutional monarchy in
Iran in 1925. (vi) In each case, moreover, it was internal
rather than external agents that instituted modernizing
authoritarian regimes. And while these regimes displayed
great ideological variation as the states evolved over
ensuing decades, from the foundational moment to today
they have shared one common feature: deep ambivalence
towards Western hegemony. (vii) Resentment of the West
references the humiliating experience of eclipse,4 and
is inculcated through school curricula, national media,
and commemorative practices, among other nationbuilding tools. (viii) Today, anti-Western sentiments—
and the promise to restore once-and-future glory—
are mobilized, in turn, for domestic or foreign policy.
(ix) Such agendas are distinctive from post-colonial
projects, which tend to eschew expansive claims. For
China, Russia, Iran, and Turkey, however, the frame is
of manifest destiny regarding their ability—realistic or
otherwise—to play order-setting roles in former imperial
geographies. (x) Finally, overlapping resentment of
the West and aspirations to power projection inform
policy coordination (Kavalski 2010). This is evident in

2 Family resemblances are especially useful for analysts committed to causal inference. Soss (2018) develops the logic for interpretivist
scholars, arguing that an exploratory commitment to “casing a study” rather than “studying a case” can better capture dynamics on the
ground. Both approaches hold promise for problem-driven, cross-regional comparisons in a multipolar world.
3 This is a feature I elsewhere theorize in juxtaposition to the colonial and post-colonial condition as the “concessionary condition” in
reference to the imposition of Capitulations regimes by European powers rather than full-fledged colonial control (Fisher Onar 2021).
4 The long-nineteenth century eclipse of these states’ ancien regimes by European powers is one source of what Zarakol (2010) characterizes
as “stigmatization” within international society, as is the Cold War experience of domination by the United States (notably in Russia, where
imperial nostalgia is arguably strongest for the Soviet rather than the Czarist period).
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endeavors like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
or the Astana group, via which Russia, Iran, and Turkey
have sought to shape outcomes in Syria. Such initiatives
hardly augur a unified block, but they provide discursive
and institutional frameworks (Schmidt 2008) for both
cooperation and rivalry, informed by an overlapping
sense that the time for Western power projection across
Eurasia is over.5
Thus, despite obvious differences, recognizing the
family resemblance between China, Russia, Iran, and
Turkey as “revisionist imperial successor states” enables
exploration of compelling mid-range questions as the
West retrenches: What commonalities and differences
drive revisionist projects? How do national narratives,
steeped in resentment of ebbing Western hegemony,
shape policies? How, for example, do such frames
intertwine with status-seeking behavior? And can they
authorize action that defies rational choice expectations?
If so, how do patterns at the sub- or trans-national levels
compare with—and potentially mitigate—revisionism
at the interstate level? What, ultimately, do our answers
suggest for the propensity of Eurasia’s resurgent powers
to clash or cooperate with each other, and with Western
counterparts?

The toolkit of CAS can help to at least begin
addressing such questions in ways that do not exclude
(re-)emerging powers’ perspectives.
Conclusion
In sum, at the dawn of multipolarity, students
of world politics—including but not limited to IR
scholars—must make sense of non-Western diversity.
To supplement an analytical apparatus forged in the
West for stronger cross-regional comparisons, I have
proposed a comparative area studies (CAS) framework
with which to examine similarities and differences
in the revisionist behavior of four major actors rarely
studied in concert. Proposing “family resemblances” as
a tool for comparison, I show that China, Russia, Iran
and Turkey are “revisionist former empires” (Fisher
Onar 2013; 2018) which can be assessed vis-a-vis their
imperial pasts, and the ways such legacies shape domestic
and foreign policy today. By thus establishing a baseline
for comparison, individual or collaborative research can
explore mid-range questions regarding cooperation and
conflict between resurgent Eurasian powers, and in their
relations with Western counterparts. The study of family
resemblances across other traditionally-segmented
area studies foci can likewise elucidate outstanding
real-world problems.
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